











It is widely understood that tracing is the process of demonstrating that two rights are linked by an 
exchange,1 such that a claim to the right given up can be “transmitted” to the right acquired.2 This 
exercise has attracted the label “exchange-product tracing”,3 and its core case is the unauthorised 
substitution of a trust right: if a trustee swaps the trust right for another in excess of her dispositive 
authority, the beneficiary can trace into the product, and (absent a defence) can claim it.4 Yet, the 
conceptual ambit of tracing is broader than this central case: if a trustee diverts money from a trust 
account to that of a third party, it is now well established that the third party receives and may be held 
accountable for the “traceable proceeds” of the trust account;5 if one or more intermediate accounts 
are interposed between the delinquent trustee and her payee, the tracing exercise requires proof that a 
“direct chain of substitutions” connects them.6 This extension is important: almost all instances of 
tracing involve one or more bank transfers.  
I argue here that efforts to subsume bank payments within an homogenous law of tracing have 
been misguided: a bank transfer does not involve a rights-substitution of the kind envisaged by 
exchange product tracing. Rather, the process that we have called “tracing money” through a bank 
transfer involves two steps: (i) converting bank money, by artifice, into an asset independent of the 
underlying account; (ii) following that asset from one location to another. Together, I call these steps 
“dummy asset tracing”. Thus, there are two kinds of tracing: exchange product tracing is the process 
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of linking two rights through an exchange by a single person; dummy asset tracing is the process of 
pursuing a notional asset (thing or right) from one person to another.  
In the first part of this article, I describe the orthodox account of exchange-product tracing, 
and argue that we should treat bank transfers as a case apart from unauthorised substitution. In the 
second, I explain how we have substantiated the connection between the claimant from whom bank 
money has been misdirected, and the third party to whom it has been paid. I call this “dummy asset 
tracing”, and I show that it manifests differently in equity and at law: in equity, the claimant follows a 
notional right into the hands of the defendant; at law, the claimant follows a notional cash thing.  
I conclude the second part by showing that dummy asset tracing has had important remedial 
consequences: by pinning liability upon the defendant’s putative receipt of an asset to which the 
claimant had a prior claim, we have come to replicate the consequences of cash transfers in bank 
payments cases, thereby increasing the ambit of third party liability. By means of dummy asset tracing, 
an innocent payee may now be held liable to a claimant with whom she did not transact, and of whom 
she was wholly unaware.7  
In the final part of this article, I argue that existing justifications for dummy asset tracing, and 
its consequences for third parties, are insufficiently robust. I show that recent authority indicates a 
move away from dummy asset tracing, towards an approach that would shape and justify liability by 
reference to the legal relationship that connects claimant and defendant.8 I argue that dummy asset 
tracing ought to be recognised as an anachronism in this new judicial landscape, and that there are 
gains to be made by permitting our jurisprudence to evolve beyond it.  
 
 
II. Exchange Product Tracing and Bank Transfers 
 
1. Exchange Product Tracing 
 
Most academic analyses of tracing begin with an example akin to the following Example 1: 
 
Example 1: T holds title to a £10 note on trust for B. T buys with it a bottle of wine, 
without B’s authority. 
 
Although opinions differ as to the logic of any claim that results from such facts, there are two clear 
facets to the orthodox tracing thesis: (i) tracing is the process of identifying title to the bottle of wine 
as the exchange product of title to the note (the “evidential” facet);9 and (ii) this process of 
 
7 See e.g. Banque Belge pour l'Etranger v Hambrouck [1921] 1 K.B. 321; 90 L.J.K.B. 322; Trustee of FC Jones v Jones [1997] 
Ch 159; Heperu v Belle [2009] NSWCA 252; (2009) 76 N.S.W.L.R. 230. 
8 Investment Trust Companies v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2017] UKSC 29; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 1200. See also Lowick 
Rose LLP v Swynson Ltd [2017] UKSC 32; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 1161. 
9 Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 127 (Lord Millett): “Tracing is the process of identifying a new asset as the 
substitute for the old”, cited in Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 at 1461 (Lewison J) for the conclusion 
that tracing is a “process not a remedy”. See also Armstrong v Winnington [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch);  [2013] Ch. 156 at [65] 
(Stephen Morris QC). 
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identification plays a role (though perhaps it does not complete the justificatory story)10 in permitting 
the claimant to transfer her claim from title to the note to title to the bottle of wine (the “relational” 
facet).11 As Smith puts it: 
 
The fundamental idea underlying tracing is that sometimes, for certain legal purposes, 
one asset stands in the place of another. A claim which could have been made in 
relation to the original asset is allowed in relation to the new asset… Tracing is the 
process which can allow the transmission of that claim to the new asset.12 
 
These twin facets have been termed “exchange tracing”13 or “exchange product tracing”.14 Exchange 
product tracing is often contrasted with following, which is understood to be the process of pursing 
an asset as it moves from one location to another.15  
Smith argues that the way in which the claimant (B) establishes a connection between the trust 
right (R) and its product (R2) is by identifying some feature of R that continues to exist throughout 
the exchange, which feature he labels “value”: 
 
The defendant acquired the value inherent in the new asset with the value inherent in 
the old asset. That is why we say that we trace value: it is the only constant that exists 
before, through and after the substitution through which we trace. It exists in a 
different form after the substitution, and that is what can justify a claim to the new 
asset.16 
 
I have argued elsewhere that this is misleading–that it has, in fact, misled courts seeking to apply 
principles of tracing.17 “Value”, in tracing, is not a description of the price that an asset might be 
expected to fetch, nor the wealth to which an individual has recourse. Rather, it is the susceptibility of 
 
10 See e.g. Boscawen v Bajwa [1996] 1 W.L.R. 328 at 334 (Millett LJ); Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 113 (Lord 
Steyn); 127 (Lord Millett); Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 at [1461]-[1464] (Lewison J); Heperu v Belle 
[2009] NSWCA 252 [90] (Allsop P); Armstrong v Winnington [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch) at [65] (Stephen Morris QC); Russell 
Gould Pty Ltd v Ramangkura [2014] NSWCA 310 at [32] (Barrett JA). 
11 It brings about “the transmission of a claimant’s property rights from one asset to its traceable proceeds”: Foskett v 
McKeown [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 127 (Lord Millett). See also NABB Brothers Limited v Lloyds Bank International (Guernsey) 
Limited [2005] EWHC 405 (Ch); [2005] All E.R. 322 at [75] (Lawrence Collins J) and Armstrong v Winnington [2012] 
EWHC 10 (Ch) at [81] (Stephen Morris QC).  
12 Smith, The Law of Tracing (1997), at p. 3. 
13 D. Oesterle, “Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace” (1982) 68 Cornell L. Rev. 172 at 174.  
14 C. Rotherham, “Property and Justice” in M. Kramer (ed.), Rights, Wrongs and Responsibilities (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan 2001), at p. 174, fn 133; B. Fitzgerald, “Tracing at Law, the Exchange Product Theory and Ignorance as an 
Unjust Factor in the Law of Unjust Enrichment” (1994) 13 University of Tasmania Law Review 117; Kwai Hung Realty 
Co Ltd v Kung Mo Ng [1997] HKCFI 399; [1998] 1 HKC 145 at [13] (Waung J). 
15 Smith, The Law of Tracing (1997), at pp. 6-8;  Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 127-8 (Lord Millett); A. Burrows, 
The Law of Restitution, 3rd edn (Oxford: OUP 2010), at p.117; Armstrong v Winnington [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch) at [65] 
(Stephen Morris QC); Russell Gould Pty Ltd v Ramangkura [31] (Barrett JA). 
16 Smith, The Law of Tracing (1997), at p. 119. See also P. Birks, “Taking Seriously the Differences Between Tracing 
and Claiming” (1997) 11 T.L.I. 2 at 4. 
17 T. Cutts, “Tracing, Value and Transactions” (2016) 79 M.L.R. 381; See now C. Mitchell, P. Mitchell and S. Watterson 
(eds), Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment, 9th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2017) Chapter 7. See also J. 
Edelman, “Understanding Tracing Rules” (2016) 16 Queensland University of Technology Law Review 9. Cf A. Nair, 
Claims to Traceable Proceeds: Law, Equity, and the Control of Assets (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018), at pp. 70-82, 
who argues that we can usefully understand value as a “metaphorical construct”. 
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a right to exchange, which I have called “exchange potential”: when T acquires R2 with R, transferring 
R to X and taking R2 for herself, she exploits the exchange potential inherent in R.18 Exchange 
potential cannot move from R to R2: the result of the transaction is that X is now in a position to exploit 
the exchange potential of R.19 Thus, value cannot be pursued from one right to another through a 
substitution in such a way as to help us to draw or define the connection between them; that connection 
is substantiated by proof of an exchange per se. 
Yet, there is one element of continuity present throughout any rights-exchange, which is 
essential to its characterisation as such. As Smith puts it: “the only connection between the old and the 
new asset is the exchange; that is, the substitution of one for the other by some person”.20 That feature 
of Example 1 which allows us to show that title to the bottle of wine is the substitute of title to the 
£10 note, and so to make good the assertion of tracing’s first facet, is T’s role as the agent of exchange: 
T gives up title to the note (R) and acquires title to the wine (R2) in its place.  
We rarely dwell on T’s role in exchange product tracing. Instead, we emphasise that R2 “is the 
potential subject matter of a claim” because it is the substitute for R, “which was itself the subject 
matter of a claim”.21 But what makes Example 1 a compelling case for rights-transmission is not only 
B’s initial claim to R; it is also the fact that T was situated at the opposite end of that claim. Prior to 
exchange, T was liable to B for title to the note (R). If T exploits the exchange potential of R, acquiring 
title to the wine (R2) in exchange, she puts it outside her power to deliver R to B. Whichever conceptual 
tools we use to clothe this more precisely,22 the peculiar role of exchange product tracing is to allow B 
to claim R2, thereby treating T’s liability for R2 as the best proxy for T’s liability for R. It is in this 
sense that B’s claim to R is “represented by” a claim to R2.23 Thus, exchange product tracing demands 
that a single actor–T–give up and receive the relevant rights; thus it permits B, without more, to 
transpose her claim from R to R2.  
 
 
2. Exchange Product Tracing and Bank Transfers 
 
Despite the status given to trustee substitution in academic commentary on tracing, the vast majority 
of tracing cases involve a set of facts more akin to the following Example 2: 
 
Example 2: T holds a bank account on trust for B. T transfers £10 from the trust 
account to that of a third party, X, without B’s authority.  
 
 
18 T. Cutts, “Tracing, Value and Transactions” (2016) 79 M.L.R. 381, at 395. 
19 T. Cutts, “Tracing, Value and Transactions” (2016) 79 M.L.R. 381, at 396. 
20 Smith, The Law of Tracing (1997), at p. 134. 
21 Smith, The Law of Tracing (1997), at p. 134. 
22 Note that this does not commit us to a particular view of the reason for liability. 
23 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch); [2005] Ch. 281 at [102] (Rimer J). 
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In these cases, principles of tracing as used as they are for Example 1, to demonstrate that X’s account 
(R2) is the traceable product of the trust account (R).24 The present editors of Goff & Jones: The Law of 
Unjust Enrichment put it thus: “it is well accepted that it is possible to trace through inter-account bank 
transfers, so as to identify the credit to the transferee’s account as the product of the debit to the paying 
customer’s account, whether the transfer is “in-house” or “inter-bank””.25 Where one or more 
accounts are interposed between R and R2, B must show that there was a “direct chain of substitutions 
whereby the claimant’s property was exchanged for another asset”.26  
There are, in fact, various problems with identifying a rights-exchange of kind required for 
exchange product tracing in Example 2.27 The first and simplest is that a bank payment may not 
involve a loss and acquisition of rights at all. In Evans v European Bank,28 Spigelman CJ raised this 
objection to characterising a bank transfer as a substitution: an account holder has a single claim to 
whatever is the present total of her account, which claim “always existed and still exists” before, 
throughout and after the putative substitution.29  
I do not think it possible to determine whether, as a matter of principle, Spigelman CJ’s 
conclusion is superior to an alternative that would recognise a rights-exchange from the fact of a bank 
transfer.30 The decision to prefer one view simply turns upon the level of abstraction at which the 
transfer is viewed. If T holds £20 in her account prior to the transfer, we can either say that the effect 
of the transfer upon her account is: (i) to decrease the value of her (pre-existing) right to £10, or; (ii) 
to replace her right with a new one, worth £10. Each is plausible.31 
Yet, even if we adopt the second reading–accept, for present purposes, that a bank transfer 
does involve a loss and acquisition of rights–obstacles remain for the use of exchange product tracing 
to connect the parties to a bank transfer. We saw above that the core instance of exchange product 
tracing demands a substitution effected by a single actor: T, who was accountable for R, is made 
accountable for the product of R, R2, in her hands. We can locate precisely such a substitution on the 
facts of Example 2, but it will not help us to substantiate a connection between the trust account and 
a credit to X’s account. Suppose that T in Example 2 held £20 in the trust account prior to transfer, 
and that X held £10 in his account prior to transfer. The effect of the subsequent transfer then is as 
 
24 See e.g. Banque Belge pour l’Etranger v Hambrouck [1921] 1 K.B. 321; Trustee of FC Jones v Jones [1997] Ch. 159; Independent 
Trustee Services v GP Noble Trustees [2012] EWCA Civ 195; [2013] Ch. 91; Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) 
Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch. 437; [2000] 4 All E.R. 221; Relfo v Varsani [2014] EWCA Civ 360. 
25 C. Mitchell, P. Mitchell and S. Watterson (eds), Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (2017), at para. [7-32]. 
26 Relfo v Varsani [2014] EWCA Civ 360 at [35] (Arden LJ). 
27 C. Mitchell, P. Mitchell and S. Watterson (eds), Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (2017), at para. [7-33]: 
“there remain difficulties in characterising the chain of intervening transactions as a series of “exchanges of assets”. 
28 Robb Evans of Robb Evans & Associates v European Bank Limited [2004] NSWCA 82; (2004) 61 N.S.W.L.R. 75. 
29 Robb Evans [2004] NSWCA 82 at [139]. This passage was cited in Hillig v Darkinjung [2006] NSWSC 1217 at [20] 
(Barrett J). 
30 E.g. B. McFarlane, “Unjust Enrichment, Property Rights, and Indirect Recipients’’ [2009] R.L.R. 37; D. Fox, Property 
Rights in Money (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), at para. [5.05]. 
31 In Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] Q.B. 728 at 750; [1989] 3 All E.R. 252 at 269 Staughton J used 
both, interchangeably. 
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follows: T gives up one right to £20, and acquires another to £10; X gives up one right to £10 and 
acquires another to £20. Thus, the facts of Example 2 reveal not one but two substitutions.32 We have 
not yet found a way of traversing the gap between B, from whose trust account £10 was misdirected, 
and X, into whose account £10 was paid.  
Thus, if exchange product tracing is to encompass simple bank transfers, we need an 
explanation for switching our attention at the evidential stage from the immediate product of T’s 
exchange in T’s hands (T’s claim to £10) to what X got in return for T’s exchange (X’s claim to £20).33 
And, at the relational stage, any such explanation must account for the difference between: (i) 
transmitting a claim to the product of a right for which the present right-holder was accountable to B; 
and (ii) transmitting a claim to the product of a right for which someone other than the present right-
holder was accountable to B. 
Smith recognises this explanatory gap, and seeks to fill it by varying the facts of an example 
akin to Example 1: 
 
Example 1.2: T holds title to a £10 note on trust for B. T buys with it a bottle of 
wine, without B’s authority. T gives the bottle of wine to X  
 
According to Smith, if–having received a right to which B has a prior claim–X is liable in Example 2, 
X ought also to be liable in a case like the following Example 1.3, in which T simply omits the 
intermediate step: 
 
Example 1.3: T holds title to a £10 note on trust for B. T buys with it a bottle of 
wine, without B’s authority, directing the vendor to give the bottle of wine to X. 
 
And this, Smith argues, is precisely how we should think of Example 2, in which X acquires the right 
for which T paid: “The only thing that differentiates this kind of substitution is that [T] did not himself 
acquire possession of his purchase”.34 Smith calls this “tracing in transit”.35 
This property analogy proceeds in three steps. First, it draws upon the logic of Example 1, 
our central case: T is liable for the substitute because T was liable for the original. Secondly, it adds a 
straightforward variation of those facts, in which that liability is transferred to X: if X receives a right 
to which B had a prior claim, X is made accountable for that right (absent any defence). Thus (and this 
 
32 This is reflected in the awkwardness of Arden LJ’s remarks that “what matters is that there has been an exchange 
of the value of the claimant’s property into the next product for which it is substituted and so on down the chain of 
substitutions” Relfo v Varsani [2014] EWCA Civ 360 at [60]. See further T. Cutts, “Modern Money Had And Received” 
(2018) 38 O.J.L.S 1 at 17. 
33 If it is on account of T’s intention to vest the product in X (as I have argued elsewhere, which explanation is adopted 
in C. Mitchell, P. Mitchell and S. Watterson (eds), Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (2017), at para. [7-33]), we 
still need to explain why this intention should permit B’s claim to have any impact on X.  
34 Smith, The Law of Tracing (1997), at p.248. 
35 Smith, The Law of Tracing (1997), at p.248. The editors of Goff and Jones have called this explanation “elegant”: C. 
Mitchell, P. Mitchell and S. Watterson (eds), Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (2017), at para.[7-33]. 
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is the final step), X should be liable where T omits the intermediate property transfer, and causes X to 
be in immediate receipt of the right. 
Yet, however compelling Smith’s explanation may be for the connection between T’s title to 
the note and X’s title to the wine in Example 1.3, the logic of the property analogy has no force on 
the facts of Example 2, for the simple reason that the Example 1.2 counterfactual is impossible: a 
bank transfer does not involve the transfer of any right.36 Thus, the second step–the argument that 
short-circuiting Example 1.2 by omitting a transfer of possession should not alter our conclusion as 
to X’s liability–is a straightforward non sequitur. If there is a reason why Example 2 and Example 1.3 
are normatively akin, we have not yet found it.   
However, I think that Smith’s reasoning does provide an important insight into the method by 
which we have come to accommodate bank transfer cases within our law of tracing. In what follows I 
seek to demonstrate that the process that we have called “tracing money” through a bank account does 
not involve exchange product tracing. Rather, it involves two steps: (i) converting bank money, by 
artifice, into an asset that is segregable from the account itself; (ii) following and locating that asset. 
Together, I call these steps “dummy asset tracing”.  
 
 
III. Dummy Asset Tracing 
 
In this part, I deal first with the use of dummy asset tracing to reach the dual conclusions that a 
beneficiary can: (i) retain an equitable title to bank money transferred by a trustee to a third party; and 
(ii) trace and recover money that is paid into a “mixed fund”. I show that the object of dummy asset 
tracing in equity is always a notional right, which supports her claim to a “persistent” equitable title. 
The purpose of this section is largely expository: the claims made here are substantially in line with at 
least a core part of orthodox trusts theory.   
Second, I consider the development of a parallel jurisprudence at law, which permits a claimant 
to trace and recover money diverted from the claimant’s account to that of a third party by someone 
who is not the claimant’s fiduciary. The argument in this section departs from orthodoxy: I argue that 
the object of dummy asset tracing at law is a physical thing, which is a notional cash asset. 
 
1. Equity  
 
Let us return to our Example 2:  
 
Example 2: T holds a bank account on trust for B. T transfers £10 from the trust 
account to that of a third party, X, without B’s authority.  
 
 
36 See e.g. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] Q.B. 728 at 750 (Staughton J): “Transfer” may be a 
somewhat misleading word, since the original obligation is not assigned”. 
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We saw above that exchange product tracing cannot readily encompass the connection between the 
right that X acquires and that which T gives up. In what follows, I show that this connection has been 
forged by interposing title to a notional money asset, which B follows throughout the steps of transfer 
from T to X, and which grounds B’s claim to X’s right. I call this “dummy asset tracing”.  
 
i) Dummy asset tracing in equity 
 
In Independent Trustee Services v GP Noble Trustees,37 some £52m had been misappropriated from various 
occupational pension schemes by their corporate trustees, GP Noble Trustees Ltd and BDC Trustees 
Ltd. Mr Anthony Morris received £4.89m of those funds, immediately paying £1.48m to his former 
wife (Mrs Morris) to satisfy his liability under a consent order. Independent Trustee Services Ltd 
(“ITS”), which had been appointed to manage the pension schemes, commenced proceedings to 
recover those funds.  
By the time the case reached the Court of Appeal, it was common ground both that the funds 
received by Mrs Morris were traceable to the breach of trust, and that she could have raised the defence 
of bona fide purchase at the time of receipt: she had given value in the form of agreeing not to pursue 
any further claims for ancillary relief. The relevant question concerned two facts: (i) Mrs Morris had 
sought and achieved rescission of the consent order under which the funds were paid, and; (ii) she had 
acquired knowledge of trust provenance of the funds before a new order for financial provision was 
made. ITS argued that this negated the effect of the defence, thereby reviving the trust. The Court of 
Appeal agreed: though Mrs Morris had obtained “legal title to the money”; nevertheless, the 
beneficiaries could “trace the £1·481m into the hands of Mrs Morris on the basis of a subsisting 
beneficial interest”.38  
In Credit Agricole Corporation and Investment Bank v Papadimitriou,39 the Privy Council considered 
an action by the owner of a collection of art deco furniture to recover the proceeds of a sale effected 
without her consent. It was common ground that the defendant bank still had, and that the claimant 
could trace, the proceeds of sale; the only question was whether the bank could raise the defence of 
bona fide purchase. Delivering judgment for the court, Lord Clarke held that it could not: the bank 
ought to have made inquiries that would have revealed the claimant’s pre-existing proprietary right to 
the funds received.  
In neither case did the court mention an “exchange” or “substitution” of rights; each simply 
identified the object of the tracing exercise, and of the beneficiaries’ “continuing beneficial interest” as 
“the money in [the defendant’s] possession”.40 We are encouraged to assume–indeed, it was common 
 
37 Independent Trustee Services v GP Noble Trustees [2012] EWCA Civ 195. 
38 ITS [2012] EWCA Civ 195 at [67]. 
39 Credit Agricole Corp and Investment Bank v Papadimitriou [2015] UKPC 13. 
40 Independent Trustee Services v GP Noble Trustees [2012] EWCA Civ 195 at [44]; Papadimitriou [2015] UKPC 13 at [2]. 
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ground in each case–that the money paid and received remained, for all relevant purposes, the same 
money throughout. Yet, it is not immediately clear how we are to reach this conclusion. We have 
already seen that a bank transfer from T to X transfers no thing or right from T to X–41 nothing, 
indeed, but a “stream of electrons”,42 through which T’s account is debited and X’s credited;43 value, 
in the sense of an accretion to the payee’s wealth, manifestly is not something that can be pursued and 
claimed per se. 
The object of the tracing exercise in these cases–“the money paid” by T to X–is not a thing or 
right that actually moves from one to the other, but a notional money asset. The sum debited from the 
trust fund is treated as an independent right, which B pursues from T to X, to support her claim against 
the latter. I have labelled these steps, aggregated, “dummy asset tracing”, and it bears emphasis that 
the object of its equitable manifestation is always a right. In what follows, we will see that this is 
conceptualised variously as a chose in action,44 or as a title to some physical cash asset that is transferred 
by delivery T to X.45 But the argument from dummy asset tracing is that X has received (and retains)46 
the trust right; this is what supports B’s claim to a “subsisting beneficial interest”. 
 
 
ii) Mixed funds 
 
The ability of equity to treat money paid and received as an asset independent of the underlying account 
underpins its approach to more complex cases, involving so-called “mixed funds”. It is accepted that 
a “mixed fund” is created where the value of the account into which the claimant seeks to trace is 
attributable to multiple sources. Take the following Example 3: 
 
Example 3: T holds a bank account on trust for B, in which stands £20. T transfers 
£10 from that account into T’s current account, in which stands £10. 
 
According to Birks, Example 3 creates a gap in the evidence through which we might connect the 
£10 transfer with any payment made subsequently from T’s current account: 
 
When money has been paid into an account (or, for that matter, into a bucket, if money 
were often so kept) and there are subsequent drawings out, it is usually not possible 
to show by evidence exactly when those particular units of value were withdrawn.47 
 
 
41 Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] Q.B. 728 at 750 (Staughton J). 
42 Agip v Jackson [1990] Ch. 265. 
43 R v Preddy [1996] A.C. 815; [1996] 3 W.L.R. 255. 
44 Agip v Jackson [1990] Ch. 265. 
45 Re Hallett's Estate (1880) 13 Ch. D 696; [1874-80] All E.R. Rep. 793. 
46 Where, as in GP Noble Trustees [2012] EWCA Civ 195 and Papadimitriou [2015] UKPC 13 the claim is proprietary, to 
a specific right.  
47 P. Birks, “Taking Seriously the Differences Between Tracing and Claiming” (1997) 11 T.L.I. 2 at 4, emphasis added. 
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Accordingly, Birks argued that “either the tracing exercise must be regarded as generally foiled by 
payment into a bank account or it must be supported by artificial presumptions”.48  
Birks acknowledged that this conceptualisation does not match the true nature of a bank 
account, which is a single, indivisible, debt:49 in his words, “a bank account which receives multiple 
credits is, metaphorically, an incorporeal mixture”.50 Without dummy asset tracing, the fact of a bank 
transfer simpliciter (with or without the addition of subsequent payments in or drawings out) does not 
create any “evidential gap”. We know exactly what happens when T makes the payment to X:51 the 
trust account is replaced with a right worth £10 and T acquires a right worth £20, which process we 
can repeat for any subsequent drawings out. It is only by treating the bank transfer as if it involved the 
transfer of a segregable asset that we reach the conclusions that: (i) the current account in Example 3 
is an “incorporeal mixture”,52 or “confusion of funds”;53 so that (ii) T’s payment creates a problem for 
any attempt to match the various credits with subsequent debits to that account.  
It is now well established that the claimant can indeed resort to “artificial presumptions” or 
“impasse-breaking rules”54 to solve this problem, which rules have been drawn from cases that involve 
physical mixtures.55 The starting point is the allocation of a claim that is equal, and abates rateably in 
proportion, to the value of the respective contributions;56 this rule applies “whenever the mixture 
consists of fungibles, whether these be physical assets like oil, grain or wine or intangibles like money 
in an account”.57 Whenever the mixing is the product of a wrongful action on the part of one of the 
contributors, this starting point is supplanted by another. In these cases, any loss is borne by the 
wrongdoer in the first instance.58 In Re Hallett’s Estate,59 Lord Jessell MR explained this consequence 
with the following analogy: 
 
The simplest case put is the mingling of trust moneys in a bag with money of the 
trustee’s own. Suppose he has a hundred sovereigns in a bag, and he adds to them 
another hundred sovereigns of his own, so that they are commingled in such a way 
that they cannot be distinguished, and the next day he draws out for his own purposes 
£100, is it tolerable for anybody to allege that what he drew out was the first £100, the 
trust money, and that he misappropriated it, and left his own £100 in the bag? It is 
 
48 P. Birks, “The Necessity of a Unitary Law of Tracing” in R Cranston (ed.), Making Commercial Law: Essays in Honour 
of Roy Goode (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997), at p. 254. 
49 Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 128 (Lord Millett). 
50 P. Birks, “Taking Seriously the Differences Between Tracing and Claiming” (1997) 11 T.L.I. 2 at 4 (emphasis added). 
51 Assuming, of course, that we the view that such a payment does affect the rights of payor and payee at all: see the 
text accompanying fn. 28-31. 
52 P. Birks, “Taking Seriously the Differences Between Tracing and Claiming” (1997) 11 T.L.I. 2 at 4. 
53 J. Ames, “Folllowing Misappropriated Property into its Product” (1906) 19 Harv L. Rev. 511, 520. 
54 P. Birks, “Taking Seriously the Differences Between Tracing and Claiming” (1997) 11 TLI 2 at 4. 
55 Smith, The Law of Tracing (1997), at p. 160. 
56 “A mixed fund, like a physical mixture, is divisible between the parties who contributed to it rateably in proportion 
to the value of their respective contributions” Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 141 (Lord Millett). 
57 Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 141 (Lord Millett). 
58 For physical mixtures see Indian Oil Corp Ltd v Greenstone Shipping Co SA (Panama) (The Ypatianna) [1988] Q.B. 345; 
[1987] 3 All E.R. 893. 
59 Re Hallett's Estate (1880) 13 Ch. D 696. 
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obvious he must have taken away that which he had a right to take away, his own 
£100.60 
 
The result must, he thought, be precisely the same for bank accounts: “[the trustee’s] money was there, 
and he had a right to draw it out, and why should the natural act of simply drawing out the money be 
attributed to anything except to his ownership of money which was at his bankers”.61 Thus, the money 
that remains in the account can be claimed by the beneficiaries. In Re Oatway,62 this rule was developed 
to allow the beneficiary to attribute her portion of the mixed fund to any purchase that returned a 
profit for the trustee, thus producing the conclusion that the beneficiary may “cherry-pick”: she may 
either say that “her funds” are still sitting in the account, or that “her funds” were used to acquire the 
new right.  
So, the basic rule is one of proportionate allocation; that rule is displaced by one that prejudices 
the wrongdoer in the event of any further dealings with the mixed fund. Amongst others, these rules 
are known as the “rules of tracing”.63 The rules of tracing are an antidote to the evidential gap created 
by tracing dummy assets in equity, through which B pursues a notional right through the stages of 
transfer from T to X. 
 
2. The Common Law 
 
It is generally understood that there is a parallel (though perhaps more limited)64 process of tracing at 
common law. “Tracing into a substitute is possible”, we are told, “provided that there has been a ‘clean 
substitution’”,65 which is to say: the claimant can trace at law from one right into its substitute so long 
as there is no mixture of the kind considered immediately above.  
Yet, much of the work performed by so-called “common law tracing” should be a puzzle to 
those who view bank transfers through the prism of exchange product tracing. We saw above that 
exchange product tracing is the process of demonstrating that one right (R2) is the product of another 
(R), in order to transmit a claim from R to R2. We also saw how his works in a typical trusts case: T, 
who was previously accountable to B for R as trustee, is now accountable to B for R2. It is much more 
difficult to see how this works at common law. Take the following Example 4: 
 
Example 4: A steals B’s bicycle, selling it for £10. 
 
 
60 Re Hallett's Estate (1880) 13 Ch. D 696. 
61 Re Hallett's Estate (1880) 13 Ch. D 696. 
62 Re Oatway [1903] 2 Ch. 356; 72 L.J. Ch. 575. 
63 P. Birks, “Taking Seriously the Differences Between Tracing and Claiming” (1997) 11 T.L.I. 2 at 4. 
64 See e.g. Fistar v Riverwood Legion and Community Club Ltd [2016] NSWCA 81 at [43] (Leeming JA). 
65 A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), at p.123. 
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Common law tracing is thought to provide a mechanism for linking B’s title to the bicycle with 
A’s title to the £10: the substitution is “clean” in the requisite sense.66 But this step is not 
straightforward: the right that A acquires and which she exchanges is a new title, which could only ever 
have been asserted by A;67 B’s title remains with B. And at the relational stage, it would seem that a 
transmission of legal title must, if it is to be effective at all, oust that of A. The latter problem is made 
only more acute by the fact of a bank transfer: 
 
Example 5: A diverts £10 from B’s bank account to A’s bank account without B’s 
authority. A then transfers £10 to C from that account. 
 
The assertion that tracing permits B to transmit a claim at law to the asset in C’s hands is an assertion 
that B can usurp, unilaterally and without notifying the bank, the position of creditor.68 
In what follows, I argue that common law tracing never has been a form of exchange product 
tracing. Those cases which establish a distinct version of tracing at law involve bank money paid and 
received, and in these cases–as in equity–the courts have interposed a notional asset, which is followed 
from one person to another through the steps of a bank transfer. I argue that the difference between 
dummy asset tracing in equity and at law goes to the nature of the asset interposed: in equity, the asset 
pursued from one party to another is a right; at law, the asset is a physical thing.  
 
i) Developing common law tracing  
 
Although most of our tracing cases involve attempts to trace and claim in equity,69 the best-known and 
foundational instance of exchange product tracing is a case that was decided in a common law court 
three decades prior to procedural fusion. In Taylor v Plumer,70 Plumer had given his stockbroker, Walsh, 
a draft for £22,500 to buy Exchequer bills. Instead, Walsh exchanged the draft for bank notes, with 
which he bought stock and gold coins. Walsh attempted to abscond to the United States, but was 
apprehended by Plumer’s agent, who confiscated the stock and gold. Walsh’s assignees in bankruptcy 
brought an action against Plumer in trover, arguing that Walsh’s act of fleeing London was an act of 
bankruptcy, which vested title in them. Departing from a long line of cases that had placed the agent’s 
authority to act at the heart of the justification for a proprietary claim to the exchange product of a 
right held on trust,71 Lord Ellenborough concluded that: 
 
 
66 Burrows, The Law of Restitution (2010), at p.123: “Examples of clean substitutions are the exchange of a car for a 
boat; or a cow for a goat; or £1000 in cash for a picture”. 
67 Armory v Delamirie (1721) 1 Strange 505; 93 E.R. 664. 
68 I consider this below, in the text accompanying fn. 95-97. 
69 See e.g. Fistar [2016] NSWCA 81 at [43] (Leeming JA). 
70 Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M. & S. 562; 105 E.R. 721. 
71 These include Perry v Phelips (1790) 1 Ves. Jr. 251; 30 E.R. 327; Cox v Bateman (1715) 2 Ves. Sen. 19; 28 E.R. 13; 
Gladstone v Hadwen (1813) 1 M. & S. 517; 105 E.R. 193 and Scott v Surman (1742) Willes 400; 125 E.R. 1235. 
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If the property in its original state and form was covered with a trust in favour of the 
principal, no change of that state and form can divest it of such trust… for the product 
of or substitute for the original thing still follows the nature of the thing itself, as long 
as it can be ascertained to be such, and the right only ceases when the means of 
ascertainment fail, which is the case when the subject is turned into money, and mixed 
and confounded in a general mass of the same description.72 
 
It is now accepted that the success of the claim depended upon Walsh’s status as trustee,73 and 
that the extension of money had and received to trustee substitution was the product of a desire to 
prevent a clash of jurisprudence between Chancery and the common law courts.74 The notion that 
there is a distinct process of tracing “at common law” stems from the popular interpretation of the 
final clause of the passage cited above:75 the emphasis placed upon the ability to distinguish money 
from a fungible mixture crystallised the idea that when a claimant cannot point to a fiduciary 
relationship at the start of the story, she must trace and claim “at common law”, which exercise is 
thwarted whenever it is confronted by a “mixed fund”.76  
I shall return to mixtures below.77 The object of present attention, to which I turn in what 
follows, is the notion that there is a common law variant of exchange product tracing, which underpins 
the claimant’s capacity to transmit her claim from one right to its traceable proceeds.  
 
ii) Modern common law tracing 
 
Despite the equitable foundation for common law tracing, it is now well established that there is a 
distinct process of tracing at common law.78 In what follows, I consider three cases that have 
encouraged that conclusion. In each, the court held that the claimant could trace at law in order to 
establish title to money debited from the claimant’s account by a wrongdoer and credited to the 
account of an innocent third party. 
In Banque Belge pour l’Etranger v Hambrouck,79 an employee had forged his employer’s signature, 
thereby procuring a transfer of some £6000 from his employer’s account to his own. Hambrouck then 
drew cheques on this account, giving them to his mistress, Mlle Spanoghe, who credited her account 
with corresponding sums. The Court of Appeal held that Banque Belge could recover £315 then 
standing in Mlle Spanoghe’s account as “their property”:80 Taylor v Plumer permitted “money though 
 
72 Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M. & S. 562. 
73 S. Khurshid and P. Matthews, “Tracing Confusion” (1979) 95 L.Q.R. 78; L Smith, “Tracing in Taylor v Plumer: Equity 
in the Court of King's Bench” [1995] L.M.C.L.Q. 240; Smith, The Law of Tracing (1997), at p. 168. 
74 T. Cutts, “Modern Money Had And Received” (2018) 38 O.J.L.S 1 at 10. 
75 Here, Lord Ellenborough put to work the words of Willes J in Scott v Surman (1742) Willes 400 at 404. See further 
T. Cutts, “Modern Money Had And Received” (2018) 38 O.J.L.S 1 at 11. 
76 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1991] Ch. 547. Televantos argues that the most important milestone was the decision in 
Re Hallett's Estate (1880) 13 Ch D 696: A. Televantos, “Losing the fiduciary requirement for equitable tracing claims” 
(2017) 133 L.Q.R. 492 at 493. 
77 See the text accompanying fn. 161-162, 
78 Trustee of FC Jones v Jones [1997] Ch.159 at 169 (Millett J). 
79 Banque Belge pour l’Etranger v Hambrouck [1921] 1 K.B. 321. 
80 Hambrouck [1921] 1 K.B. 321 at 333 (Bankes LJ)). 
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changed in character to be recovered, if it can be traced”;81 as she had given no valuable consideration, 
Mlle Spanoghe could not “set up a title derived from Hambrouck, who had no title against the true 
owner”.82 Thus, title either remained with the bank throughout,83 or had revested when the bank 
expressed a desire to disavow the transaction.84 
 In Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale,85 Cass, one of the partners of a firm of solicitors, obtained funds 
from a client account by withdrawing cash by cheque, and by causing funds to be transferred to 
building society accounts in his name, from which he withdrew cash. He used that money to gamble 
in the defendant casino. Considering Hambrouck to be clear authority for the solicitors’ ability to “trace 
their property at common law” in the bank account “into its product, i.e. cash drawn by Cass from 
their client account at the bank”,86 the House of Lords ordered the casino to pay the firm a sum 
equivalent to that which it had received from Cass, reduced to reflect sums that it had paid out sums 
to Cass as winnings.  
In Trustee of FC Jones v Jones,87 Mr Jones had drawn cheques in his wife’s favour on his insolvent 
firm. She used the funds thereby credited to her account to speculate successfully in potato futures. 
The trustee in bankruptcy was held to be entitled to “trace his money at Midland Bank into the money 
in the defendant’s account with the commodity brokers”,88 and to claim the proceeds of her 
investments as its property. Lord Millett called this claim “exclusively proprietary”,89 concluding that, 
“as from the date of the act of bankruptcy the money in the bankrupts’ joint account at Midland Bank 
belonged to the trustee”.90 Again, the court held that the claimant retained title throughout, so that 
Mrs Jones was “in possession of funds to which she had no title”.91 
In each of these cases, the defendant’s liability depended upon the claimant’s ability to show a 
title to the intermediate money asset in the wrongdoer’s hands; in each, the court held that the claimant 
was able to do so, and that this title was a claim at common law. This conclusion has proven 
exceedingly difficult to explain.92 In Lipkin Gorman, Lord Goff was not prepared to depart from a series 
of cases that established conclusively that the cash withdrawn from the client account, and that which 
 
81 Hambrouck [1921] 1 K.B. 321 at 330 (Bankes LJ) 
82 Hambrouck [1921] 1 K.B. 321 at 330 (Bankes LJ). 
83 Hambrouck [1921] 1 K.B. 321 at 327 (Bankes LJ). 
84 Hambrouck [1921] 1 KB 321 at 322 (Atkin LJ). 
85 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale [1991] 2 A.C. 548; [1992] 4 All E.R. 512. 
86 Lipkin Gorman [1991] 2 A.C. 548 at 574 (Lord Goff). 
87 Trustee of FC Jones v Jones [1997] Ch. 159. 
88 FC Jones [1997] Ch. 159 at 170. 
89 FC Jones [1997] Ch. 159 at 168. 
90 FC Jones [1997] Ch. 159 at 166. This nominally produced the absurd result that the trustee in bankruptcy was creditor; 
in practice it permitted the claimant to recover the original sum and profits, all of which had been paid into court. 
91 FC Jones [1997] Ch. 159 at 167. 
92 In L. Smith, “Simplifying Claims to Traceable Proceeds” (2009) 125 L.Q.R 338 at 338 Smith says that “There are 
as many theories of Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd as there are writers on the subject”. See fn.2 for the commentaries 
listed there.  
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was transferred from the account into Cass’ building society account, belonged to Cass.93 Nevertheless, 
he held that the cash was “[the solicitors’] property at common law”.94 This apparent contradiction is 
exacerbated by the nature of the asset claimed in both Hambrouck and Trustee of FC Jones. If the claimant, 
by tracing, acquires an immediate claim at common law to the relevant account, it is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that she thereby usurps the position of creditor.95 This obviates the rules prohibiting 
secret assignment,96 and make it impossible for the debtor to know from whom she can obtain a good 
receipt.97 
In the next section, I explain that a substantial part of this confusion has been caused by 
aggregating two different types of case. The first, which reflects the fact pattern of Lipkin Gorman v 
Karpnale, and which I considered above, is as follows: 
 
Example 1.2: T holds title to a £10 note on trust for B. T buys with it a bottle of 
wine, without B’s authority. T gives the bottle of wine to X.  
 
I argue (like others)98 that Example 1.2 involves the common law recognition of a claim in equity, to 
the object of a trust.  
The second type of case, which reflects the fact pattern of Banque Belge v Hambrouck and 
(imperfectly) Trustee of FC Jones v Jones, is as follows: 
 
Example 5: A diverts £10 from B’s bank account to A’s bank account without B’s 
authority. A then transfers £10 to C from that account. 
 
I argue (unlike others)99 that Example 5 involves the pursuit of a notional asset from B to C, which I 
have called “dummy asset tracing”. 
 
iii) Exchange product tracing at common law 
 
The prevailing view of the common law tracing cases that I have considered so far is that they are 
mislabelled: in each, the claimants did not acquire a direct claim in respect of the cash, or against the 
bank; rather they acquired a claim to the defendant’s right – or, in other words, a trust.100  
 
93 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale [1991] 2 A.C. 548 at 573 (Lord Goff). 
94 Lipkin Gorman [1991] 2 A.C. 548 at 574 (Lord Goff). 
95 Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), at para. [5.02]. 
96 Durham Bros v Robertson [1896] 1 Q.B. 765; [ 1895-9] All E.R. Rep. Ext. 1683. 
97 P. Birks, “Taking Seriously the Differences Between Tracing and Claiming’”(1997) 11 T.L.I. 2 at 7. 
98 See e.g. L. Smith, “Simplifying Claims to Traceable Proceeds” (2009) 125 L.Q.R 338; B. McFarlane, “Unjust 
Enrichment, Property Rights, and Indirect Recipients” [2009] R.L.R. 37; Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), at para. 
[5.103]. 
99 For Smith and McFarlane, these cases also involve trusts: L. Smith, “Simplifying Claims to Traceable Proceeds” 
(2009) 125 L.Q.R 338 at 346; B. McFarlane, “Unjust Enrichment, Property Rights, and Indirect Recipients’’ [2009] 
R.L.R. 37. 
100 L. Smith, “Simplifying Claims to Traceable Proceeds” (2009) 125 L.Q.R 338 at 346; B. McFarlane, “Unjust 
Enrichment, Property Rights, and Indirect Recipients’’ [2009] R.L.R. 37. 
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It is relatively easy to reconcile this analysis with the way in which Lord Goff conceptualised 
the claim in Lipkin Gorman. Lord Goff noted that, “even if legal title to the money did vest in Cass 
immediately on receipt, nevertheless he would have held it on trust for his partners, who would 
accordingly have been entitled to trace it in equity”;101 yet, he emphasised that “your Lordships are not 
concerned with an equitable tracing claim in the present case, since no such case is advanced by the 
solicitors, who have been content to proceed at common law”.102 We have seen that this is precisely 
the proposition for which Taylor v Plumer stood at the time of its decision, which is that the common 
law ought to recognise a personal claim for money had and received on facts that would have given 
rise to a trust, if the case had been framed and brought as an equitable action. 
If we adopt this explanation of Lipkin Gorman, the only relevant difference between that case 
and Taylor v Plumer is that in the former the trust asset was in the hands of a third party at the time of 
the claim; in the latter, the principal had seized it from his trustee. Thus, the facts of Lipkin Gorman are 
analogous to our Example 1.2: 
 
Example 1.2: T holds title to a £10 note on trust for B. T buys with it a bottle of 
wine, without B’s authority. T gives the bottle of wine to X.  
 
No additional explanation, beyond the mere fact of receipt, is necessary to account for the firm’s claim 
against the casino: the claim that arose upon Cass’ substitution persisted through the cash transfer to 
the casino, grounding a claim to the money in its hands.  
Yet, whilst it is possible to construct a strong case for an equitable account of Lipkin Gorman, 
that account depends upon three features that make it an uneasy template for all of our common law 
tracing cases. The first is that there must be grounds for the conclusion that the intermediate party is 
a trustee of the right acquired. The facts of Trustee of FC Jones can be reconciled with that conclusion 
(though the court did not, of course, explain the claim in that way): Mr Jones, as a partner to the firm 
from which he misdirected funds, might well have been accountable for title to the cheque that he 
gave to Mrs Jones.103 But it is much more difficult to find similar grounds for the conclusion that 
Hambrouck, who was not in the position of a fiduciary with respect to the claimant, was a nevertheless 
a trustee of the account from which he paid Mlle Spanoghe.104 Secondly, the equitable account of 
Lipkin Gorman requires that the third party receive the object of the trust. If this is possible in Trustee 
of FC Jones, it is not in Hambrouck: the right received by Mlle Spanoghe – title to the cheque and then 
the right against her bank – was a new right, different from title to the cheque through which 
Hambrouck debited Pelabon’s account or Hambrouck’s right against his bank. Third, the right claimed 
 
101 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale [1991] 2 A.C. 548 at 572. 
102 Lipkin Gorman [1991] 2 A.C. 548 at 572. 
103 See 29(1) Partnership Act 1890 and Don King Productions Inc v Warren [1998] 2 All E.R. 608; [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 
176; Barber v Rasco International Ltd [2012] EWHC 269; [2012] All E.R.  22.  
104 We might be able to reach the conclusion that Hambrouck was a trustee of the cheque, by reference to the 
mechanics of rescission, but rescission revests title; the account was not an asset with which the bank began. 
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must be the trust right. And here, neither case fits the trusts analysis: in Trustee of FC Jones, as in 
Hambrouck, the right claimed was not the cheque that moved from wrongdoer to third party, but the 
account into which the funds were paid. If there is a reason for reconceptualising these cases on the 
basis of equitable principles, and treating the steps of payment as a single property transfer, so as to 
warrant the analogy between Example 1.2 and Hambrouck and FC Jones, we have not yet found it.   
 
 
iv) Dummy asset tracing at common law 
 
Example 5 is intended to serve as a proxy for the facts of Hambrouck and FC Jones: 
 
Example 5: A diverts £10 from B’s bank account to A’s bank account without B’s 
authority. A then transfers £10 to C from that account. 
 
I argue here that the tracing process established by these cases is a form of dummy asset tracing, in 
which the notional asset interposed is a physical cash asset. 
In Agip v Jackson,105 a payment order had been altered fraudulently to name Baker Oil as 
beneficiary. That order was executed by the claimant’s bank, Banque du Sud, which debited their 
account with $518,822.92, and instructed Baker Oil’s bank (Lloyds Bank) to credit Baker Oil’s account 
in London with the same sum, giving instructions to its correspondent bank in New York to reimburse 
Lloyds Bank. Lloyds Bank acted on those instructions. At the third defendant’s behest, it then 
transferred the sum to the account of the defendants’ firm with the bank. 
The putative problem with tracing at common law lay in the existence of clearing, which the 
court treated as a kind of “mixed fund”.106 We saw above that equity treats money paid and received 
as a right that retains its integrity as it moves through the steps of transfer, and which survives 
admixture. Thus, there was “no difficulty in tracing the plaintiffs’ property in equity, which can follow 
the money as it passed through the accounts of the correspondent banks in New York or, more 
realistically, follow the chose in action through its transmutation”.107 Millett J was clear, however, that 
tracing at common law has never benefited from the same flexibility. Echoing the words of Lord 
Greene in Re Diplock, 108 Millett J said: 
 
The common law has always been able to follow a physical asset from one recipient 
to another. Its ability to follow an asset in the same hands into a changed form was 
established in Taylor v Plumer. In following the plaintiff's money into an asset purchased 
exclusively with it, no distinction is drawn between a chose in action such as the debt 
of a bank to its customer and any other asset: In re Diplock. But it can only follow a 
physical asset, such as a cheque or its proceeds, from one person to another. It can 
follow money but not a chose in action. Money can be followed at common law into 
 
105 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] Ch. 265. 
106 Agip v Jackson [1990] Ch. 265 at 289. 
107 Agip v Jackson [1990] Ch. 265 at 289. 
108 [1948] Ch. 465 at 520; [1948] 2 All E.R. 318 at 344. 
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and out of a bank account and into the hands of a subsequent transferee, provided 
that it does not cease to be identifiable by being mixed with other money in the bank 
account derived from some other source.109 
 
There are four steps to this analysis, which has been taken as the starting point for very many 
accounts of the distinction between common law and equitable tracing: (i) there are two kinds of 
tracing – tracing from one asset to another in the same set of hands, and tracing from one person to 
another; (ii) in the latter capacity, common law tracing always demands a physical object; (iii) the 
common law will treat money in an account as such a physical asset, but (iv) it will not do so if there 
is a “mixed fund” (which is either an account into which money has been paid from multiple sources, 
or clearing). Thus, like equity, the common law is able to turn a bank transfer from one person to 
another into the transfer of a notional asset; unlike equity, that notional asset is always physical cash. 
This difference lies at heart of the common law’s inferior capacity to deal with mixed funds: a process 
that treats money in a “strictly materialistic way” cannot cope with a confusion of fungible claims.110 
This makes a great deal more sense of the decisions in Banque Belge v Hambrouck and Trustee of 
FC Jones v Jones: by treating each bank payment as if it transferred a cash asset to the defendant, the 
court could at once recognise that the payee was creditor and hold that the transfer vested in the 
claimant a title that could ground a claim to get it back from the eventual recipient. And it explains 
why Lord Millett saw nothing wrong with the conclusion that the trustee’s claim in FC Jones was both 
a claim at law and a property claim: the subject matter of that claim was not the bank debt (which 
could only have been owed to Mrs Jones, and which could not have been “owned” at all) but the 
notional money asset that it represented. Thus, Mrs Jones was “in possession of funds to which she 
had no title”.111 
 
v) Dummy asset tracing and unjust enrichment  
 
Though it is by no means the only justification offered for claims that depend upon tracing,112 the 
debate concerning how best to conceptualise Hambrouck, Lipkin Gorman and FC Jones has largely taken 
place within the parameters of unjust enrichment theory. Yet, the relationship between unjust 
enrichment and tracing has been described as “far from an easy topic”.113 In particular, it has proven 
extremely difficult to reconcile tracing with the requirement that the enrichment must come “at the 
expense of” the claimant. 
 
109 Agip v Jackson [1990] Ch. 265 at 285. 
110 Re Diplock [1948] Ch. 465 at 520. 
111 Trustee of FC Jones v Jones [1997] Ch.159 at 167. 
112 In Foskett v McKeown, Lord Millett insisted that tracing was not part of the law of unjust enrichment: [2001] 1 A.C. 
102 at 127. See also Lord Browne Wilkinson at 108, Lord Steyn and Lord Hoffmann at 115, and Lord Hope at 125-6 
(though note that the case involved trustee substitution).  
113 A. Burrows: The Law of Restitution, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), at p.117. 
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According to Burrows, the decision in Hambrouck exemplifies a “title and tracing” exception 
to the ordinary rule that the claimant who seeks to recover money from the defendant in an action for 
restitution of an unjust enrichment must be the “direct provider” of that sum:114 “by means of tracing 
and title, a claimant can show that value in a substitute asset comprises a transfer of value from the 
claimant: one is tracing value as it is transferred from the claimant’s asset to its substitute”.115 Thus, in 
the following Example 5, B can trace through each substitution (B’s right for A’s right, A’s right for 
C’s right), thereby demonstrating that the credit to C’s account represents a transfer of value from her: 
 
Example 5: A diverts £10 from B’s bank account to A’s bank account without B’s 
authority. A then transfers £10 to C from that account. 
 
Framed as a process of pursuing value, Taylor v Plumer and Hambrouck appear identical: the 
claimant can either pursue value from one right to another through an exchange, or she can pursue 
value from one person to another through a transfer; either way, the claimant can show that the 
defendant received value that emanated from her. I have argued elsewhere that this is a mistake, which 
conflates two distinct kinds of value.116 The first is the susceptibility of a right to exchange (which I 
have called exchange potential); this is the kind of value involved in exchange product tracing, and it 
does not move from one right to another.117 The second is wealth (value measured as a sum of the 
purchasing power to which an individual has recourse, minus her liabilities). This is the kind of value 
involved in a bank transfer from one person to another, and it provides no mechanism for connecting 
B’s account with that of C (with whom B had no dealings) so as to substantiate B’s claim that C should 
reverse A’s wrongful debit. The conclusion “B’s wealth has reached C’s hands” requires prior proof 
that there is a sufficient connection between the two transfers, which connection is ordinarily 
established by demonstrating that B (or B’s agent) paid C. If there is a reason for applying a different 
test to such facts, the notion of value does not provide it.   
Birks offered a simpler account of three-party cases. For Birks, “a receipt of your money is 
always a receipt directly from you”,118 so that if the claimant can establish a proprietary claim to the 
thing or right transferred to the defendant, it would be irrelevant that someone else effected transfer: 
 
If I find your wallet it makes no difference whether I am the first recipient or the 
second or the twenty-second. Suppose a pickpocket took it and, in alarm, threw it 
down, and then I found it. My position would be exactly the same as if your wallet had 
fallen from your pocket into the road in front of me without your noticing its loss.119  
 
 
114 Burrows, The Law of Restitution (2010), at p.119. 
115 Burrows, The Law of Restitution (2010), at p.119. 
116 T. Cutts, “Tracing, Value and Transactions” (2016) 79 M.L.R. 381 at 392-396. 
117 See above, the text accompanying fn. 17-20. 
118 P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004), at pp. 86-7. 
119 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2004), at p. 87. 
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Thus, the “proprietary connection”,120 which justifies the claimant’s claim against a party with whom 
she did not transact directly, is no more or less than persisting title 
Birks applied this account directly to the facts of Hambrouck,121 thereby treating the money 
paid by the bank to Hambrouck, and by Hambrouck to Mlle Spanoghe, as transfer akin to that of a 
physical cash asset. This reflects the approach adopted explicitly by the court in that case, which 
encouraged the conclusion that Mlle Spanoghe could not “set up a title derived from Hambrouck, who 
had no title against the true owner”.122 This is what I have called dummy asset tracing, and it allows us 
to conceptualise Example 5 as a simple transfer of money that is owned by the claimant at law into 
the hands of a third party: C receives a notional cash asset to which B has or had a better title.  
There has been some debate about whether cases that involve receipt of the claimant’s 
property are appropriately termed “unjust enrichment” at all.123 I have considered this elsewhere,124 
and will not dwell on it here, save to say this: to the extent that the legal event responsible for the 
creation of liability is some breach of a (real or putative) exclusionary obligation, the alternative clothing 
in unjust enrichment seems at best unnecessary, and at worst confusing. However, I have not yet 
addressed the question that is logically prior to taxonomical one: in the final part of this paper, I will 
analyse existing justifications for using principles of property to ground and shape liability for 
misdirected bank money.  
 
IV. Justifying Dummy Asset Tracing 
 
We have seen that dummy asset tracing allows a claimant to connect her bank account with that of an 
innocent third party payee, in order to support her claim for restitution from the latter. In what follows, 
I argue that there is no robust justification for this outcome, and that we should embrace judicial efforts 
to direct attention to the role that the defendant has played in any misallocation of funds for which the 
claimant seeks to hold her accountable.   
 
1. The cash analogy 
 
Whenever it has been necessary to formulate a justification for dummy asset tracing, it is usually along 
the following lines: the defendant would be liable if the facts involved dealings with physical money; 
thus, liability cannot be escaped by the mere fact that the money happens to take an intangible form.125 
This has been framed, alternatively, as an institutional or individual claim.  
 
120 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2004), at p. 87. 
121 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2004), at pp. 86-87. 
122 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2004), at p. 87.  
123 See e.g. W. Swadling, “Ignorance and Enrichment: the Problem of Title” (2008) 28 O.J.L.S. 627. 
124 T. Cutts, “Modern Money Had And Received” (2018) 38 O.J.L.S 1 9. 
125 Re Hallett’s Estate (1880) 13 Ch. D 696. 
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Proctor makes the institutional case for dummy asset tracing: “if money is to exist in several 
different forms”, he says, “the law should certainly ensure that the rights of a person who receives 
‘money’ are the same, irrespective of the precise form in which that money is conveyed”.126 Thus, the 
law must attribute to bank media “characteristics which will enable it effectively to fulfil functions 
which similar to those performed by notes and coins”.127 One such characteristic goes to the 
circumstances in which money can be recovered: though money can be “followed in rem against a 
holder who acted in bad faith or gave no consideration”, it must (Proctor says) be irrecoverable from 
a good faith payee.128 
This requires some unpacking. In contrast with other tangible assets, cash cannot be recovered 
from a good faith payee.129 This is known as the rule that money “has no ear-mark”, and it helps to 
ensure fluid circulation by affording cheap and easy confidence to the holder of their security of 
receipt.130 Proctor’s argument, here, is that if we want bank money to circulate with equivalent fluidity, 
that rule must be applied to money in all its forms.  
In fact, that confidence in security of receipt which might be supplied by lending bank money 
the same legal attributes as cash is already supplied by the irrevocability of the payment instruction by 
which credit is transferred.131 There is no need to treat bank money as if it had no ear-mark: a payment 
instruction neither conveys any asset that an individual might segregate and claim from her payee, nor–
once the participating bank has acted to debit one account and credit another–can it be reversed. It is 
only by first treating bank money as property that we encounter the need to limit the circumstances in 
which it can be recovered; if we do not admit property concepts into bank transfers, the problem does 
not arise. In short, the instrumental argument counts against dummy asset tracing.   
The analogical case is not much stronger at an individual level. According to Webb, a bank 
transfer is “equivalent to the handing over of that same sum in cash” because it amounts to the 
depletion of a facility to put the holder in funds that is “matched exactly and directly” by an addition 
to that of the transferee.132 A bank transfer thus “serves the same function” as a cash transfer, “taking 
funds at my disposal and making them available to you”.133  
There are various ways in which Webb’s argument might bear on the justification for dummy 
asset tracing. Webb’s primary objective is to show that there is something functionally equivalent about 
different money forms, which justifies the extension of principles of unjust enrichment from one to 
the other. I will not dwell on this point, save to note that this argument is at least more difficult than 
 
126 C. Proctor (ed.), Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, 7th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012) 43. 
127 Proctor (ed.), Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (2012) 43. 
128 Proctor (ed.), Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (2012) 43. 
129 Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr. 452; 97 E.R. 398. 
130 See Miller (1758) 1 Burr. 452 at 459 (Lord Mansfield).  
131 The Brimnes [1973] 1 W.L.R. 386; [1973] 1 All E.R. 769; Tayeb v HSBC Bank [2004] EWCH 1529, [2004] 4 All E.R. 
1024. 
132 C. Webb, Reason and Restitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016), at p. 99. 
133 Webb, Reason and Restitution (2016), at p. 98. 
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Webb makes it seem: however I may conceptualise “my” bank money in a funds transfer from my 
account to that of my payee, the fact is that it consists of a contractual claim that is at least one step 
removed from, and substantially more precarious than, that which we describe as “cash”.  
For present purposes, the more important point goes to the scope of that liability. There is a 
great deal of difference between invoking principles of property to justify a bank transferee’s liability 
for money paid to her by the claimant, and doing so to justify a third party’s liability for money 
transferred to her by someone other than the claimant. Indeed, Webb’s claim that the property analogy 
depends on a kind of “directness” carries a strong implication that this justification for restitution is 
limited to those who deal as payor and payee.  
The question of whether or not it is appropriate to use property principles to define the scope 
of liability for intangible assets is not new to private law. The thrust of the decision in OBG v Allan,134 
that a person who sought to usurp the contractual claim of another could not be held liable in 
conversion, is that we should be chary of extending the ambit of exclusionary duties to intangible 
assets. There are good reasons for this: it is usually far easier for someone to recognise and comply 
with exclusionary obligations in respect of objects that have some tangible form.135  
Yet, there is an important sense in which the contract in OBG v Allan was a better candidate for 
ownership than bank money paid. If the exclusionary responsibility were to extend only to a true 
usurpation of contractual rights, it would not often be possible to breach it accidentally. By contrast, 
dummy asset tracing gives rise to liability for interfering with the (fictional) property claim of a person 
who may be wholly unknown to the defendant, on the basis of a defective transaction that occurred at 
some point in time prior to the payment now impugned. It is extremely easy to interfere with such a 
claim accidentally. Such was the court’s conclusion as to Mrs Jones’ position in Trustee of FC Jones v 
Jones:136 Mrs Jones knew nothing about the circumstances through which her husband diverted money 
from his partnership; yet, she was strictly liable for the profits that she acquired by investing it.  
Neither the institutional nor individual argument supplies a robust defence for this conclusion 
– that an innocent payee, who did not transact with the claimant, may be held liable in circumstances 
that gave her no reason to suspect that her activities would conflict with the claimant’s prior 
entitlement.137 Precedent alone cannot justify dummy asset tracing, and I show in what remains of this 
article that precedent is evolving in a manner that is conceptually inconsistent with it: courts tasked 
with defining the scope of liability for bank money misapplied have emphasised the need for a legal 
relationship that connects claimant and defendant directly.  
 
 
134 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 A.C. 1. 
135 See e.g. OBG [2007] UKHL 21 at [321] (Lord Brown); B. McFarlane and S. Douglas, “Defining Property Rights” 
in J. Penner and H. Smith (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), at 
p.239. 
136 Trustee of FC Jones v Jones [1997] Ch. 159. 
137 See e.g. Banque Belge pour l’Etranger v Hambrouck [1921] 1 K.B. 321; FC Jones [1997] Ch. 159. 
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2. The future 
 
There are new indications that courts tasked with justifying, and defining the scope of, liability for bank 
money misapplied are prepared to look more closely at the relationship between the claimant and 
defendant. I argue here that this development is incompatible with a process that would impose liability 
for the passive receipt of a notional asset, and that we should be prepared to allow our jurisprudence 
to evolve beyond principles of dummy asset tracing.  
 
(i) The claimant’s counterparty  
 
We saw above that B may pursue a notional money asset through the steps of transfer in order to 
maintain a claim at law against C, who is not her payee: 
 
Example 5: A diverts £10 from B’s bank account to A’s bank account without B’s 
authority. A then transfers £10 to C from that account. 
 
In what follows, I show that courts are beginning to take more seriously the search for a meaningful 
connection between claimant and defendant, which has been mediated though the notion that a “single 
transaction” must unite them. I argue that this is incompatible with, and should supersede, the 
orthodox approach to Example 5: B ought not to be entitled to recover from C, with whom she did 
not transact; there ought to be no alternative route to C’s liability by “tracing” through A’s account.  
In Investment Trust Companies v Revenue and Customs Commissioners,138 the claimants brought a claim 
against HMRC for restitution of sums paid by investment managers to discharge a putative tax liability 
from which the managers were in fact exempt under EU law. The claimants sought to ground their 
claim in an earlier payment that they had made to the managers in respect of services provided by the 
latter, called “VAT” and paid on the understanding that it was due.  
Giving judgment for the Supreme Court, Lord Reed rejected previous assertions that a 
“sufficient causal connection” could substantiate the requisite connection between claimant and 
defendant,139 insisting that a “direct transfer of value”140 was necessary, and must be established either 
by proof of a relationship of agency between the claimant and the defendant’s payor,141 or by “a set of 
co-ordinated transactions” that formed a “single scheme or transaction”142–where to consider each 
individual transaction separately would be unrealistic”.143 Lord Reed considered that such a scheme 
could not be established on the instant facts: rather, “there were two separate transactions–first, 
 
138 Investment Trust Companies v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2017] UKSC 29. 
139 See e.g. Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus UK [2015] UKSC 66; [2016] A.C. 176. 
140 ITC [2017] UKSC 29 at [9]. 
141 ITC [2017] UKSC 29 at [48]. 
142 ITC [2017] UKSC 29 at [48]. 
143 ITC [2017] UKSC 29 at [48]. 
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between the Claimants and the Managers, and secondly between the Managers and the 
Commissioners”.144 Thus, HMRC had not been enriched at the claimants’ expense.  
By placing the parties’ legal relations inter se at the heart of the requisite connection, Lord Reed 
judgment takes us a step towards direct engagement with the question of when a defendant is 
sufficiently implicated in the impugned event as to warrant her liability to make restitution. Progress 
should not be overstated: though he rejected the case for a transactional link on the facts of ITC, Lord 
Reed did not present anything like a template for determining what does meet that threshold. Moreover, 
he left intact the notion that the “at the expense of” nexus could be proven “where the defendant 
receives property from a third party into which the claimant can trace an interest”.145  Yet, if we can 
give shape to the transactional test,146 a parallel route to restitution that grounds liability in the passive 
receipt of a notional asset is not merely superfluous; it altogether undermines the thrust of a move to 
focus upon the legal relationship that forms a genuine connection between payor and payee. If C in 
Example 5 is not B’s counterparty, that ought to be the end of the matter: there should be no 
alternative enquiry into whether B can “trace” through A’s account, to support C’s liability to B. I 
return to tracing below; there is some evidence of a confluence between the mechanisms of tracing 
and the transactional approach to unjust enrichment that would render this point moot.147  
The transactional approach may also provide the requisite impetus to revisit other areas in 
which dummy asset tracing has obfuscated the reason for liability. Take the following example: 
 
Example 6: A, director of B Co, transfers money from B Co’s bank account to C’s 
bank account without B Co’s authority. 
 
Cases that adopt this pattern have been forced into the mould of property transfers: the tracing 
question is thought to determine whether assets can be connected to a breach of trust,148 enabling a 
beneficiary to recover, or claim in respect of, “trust property that has been misappropriated”.149 This 
both diverts attention from the question of whether a particular transaction was within the scope of 
the directors’ authority,150 and disguises the true nature of the circumstances through which a third 
party may come to benefit from a director’s breach of fiduciary duty:151 a director who diverts funds 
 
144 ITC [2017] UKSC 29 at [72]. 
145 ITC [2017] UKSC 29 at [48]. 
146 I have argued that the process of construing and characterising transactions should be conducted by reference to 
its commercial counterpart, for which there are well-established rules: T. Cutts, “Tracing, Value and Transactions” 
(2016) 79 M.L.R. 381. 
147 See below, the test accompanying fn. 157. 
148 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch.437. 
149 Relfo v Varsani [2014] EWCA Civ 360 at [65]. Televantos explains that not all such cases have involved genuine 
trust relationships; nevertheless he thinks the proprietary connection pivotal: A. Televantos, “Losing the fiduciary 
requirement for equitable tracing claims” (2017) 133 L.Q.R. 492 at 503. 
150 This was ignored in BCCI v Akindele [2001] Ch. 437. See also Criterion Properties v Stratford UK Properties [2004] UKHL 
28; [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1846 at [4] (Lord Nicholls). 
151 M. Conaglen and R. Nolan, “Contracts and knowing receipt: principles and application” L.Q.R. 359 at 359.  
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from the company account is an agent, not a trustee,152 and a company is not a beneficiary of its bank 
accounts; it is the creditor at law.  
Without dummy asset tracing, we are able to address this distinction directly. If A lacks the 
authority to make the payment, Example 6 fits neatly within Lord Reed’s categories, and the model 
of a standard two-party claim for restitution of an unjust enrichment: B Co, who is made a party to the 
transaction effected by its agent, A, can set that transaction aside and recover money paid to C as an 
unjust enrichment at its expense. There is no question of tracing, nor any of third party liability: C is B 
Co’s counterparty and proper defendant at law.  
Last, rejecting dummy asset tracing gives us a new reason to revisit the justification for 
awarding proprietary restitution where B can establish that C is her payee: if a bank payment does not 
transfer any segregable asset, there is good reason to think that the best way of restoring both parties 
to the status quo ante is a personal claim, to reverse both debit and credit.153 
 
(ii) The trustee’s counterparty 
 
We saw above that courts have approached the following Example 2, like Example 5, by following 
a notional asset from T to X: 
 
Example 2: T holds a bank account on trust for B. T transfers£10 from the trust 
account to that of a third party, X, without B’s authority.  
 
Dummy asset tracing supports a proprietary claim, to vindicate “pre-existing equitable proprietary 
rights”,154 or a personal claim for the “knowing receipt” of a trust asset. 
If, as I have argued, we reject the notion that X receives an asset from T, the transactional 
approach can be a useful catalyst for conceptual clarity here too. It is now clear that a beneficiary may 
set aside certain transactions effected by her trustee.155 Here, the case for X’s liability is not made on 
the basis that the payee is B’s counterparty; rather, the argument is that T has executed a transaction 
that (whether for a want of authority, or other breach of trust) she should not have, which transaction 
B is procedurally competent to set in train the necessary steps to unwind.156  
There are two important consequences of the transactional account of the circumstances in 
which a beneficiary may proceed against her trustee’s payee. The first mirrors the discussion above, of 
the manner in which a claimant goes about proving the requisite nexus for restitutionary liability: B 
 
152 Cf R. Chambers, “The End of Knowing Receipt” (2016) 2 Canadian Journal of Comparative and Contemporary 
Law Aug 1 at 20: Chambers argues that a constructive trust arises by operation of law.  
153 See J. Edelman, “Restitution of (Property) Rights”, paper provided to the University of Melbourne Colloquium on 
Proprietary Rights, 2012. 
154 Independent Trustee Services v GP Noble Trustees [2012] EWCA Civ 195; [2013] Ch. 91 [91]. 
155 Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26; [2013] 2 A.C. 108. 
156 Whether B requires judicial assistance depends on the nature of the transaction, and on whether it was effected in 
breach of trust, or wholly in excess of authority. 
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must show that X is T’s counterparty to the transaction impugned; it will not be enough, without more, 
to demonstrate that the impugned payment was made from an account into which T paid misdirected 
trust funds. It is worth noting in this regard that courts tasked with applying principles of equitable 
tracing in fact pre-empted Lord Reed’s approach in ITC. Most notably, the Privy Council in The Federal 
Republic of Brazil v Durant International Corporation rejected the argument that the interposition of debt 
necessarily thwarted the tracing exercise; rather, claimant and defendant could be connected by means 
of a set of “interconnected transactions” that formed part of a “co-ordinated scheme”.157 In this sense, 
the goal at law and in equity appears to be a common one: a genuine connection is sought from a 
single, overarching, transaction, to which defendant is situated as one party, and the claimant (or her 
trustee) the other. Yet it bears repeating that this objective demands a concerted effort to draw precise 
contours for that nexus. 
Second, if we reject dummy asset tracing, it follows that we reject the proprietary response to 
Example 2; X does not receive any asset that is recoverable in specie. This entails a departure from the 
reasoning in cases like ITS v GP Noble Trustees, but it does not necessarily demand that we disregard 
certain operative facts. In ITS, the defendant was not insolvent; the claim was not framed as proprietary 
in order to elevate its priority with respect to her creditors. Rather, the nature of the claim was 
prescribed by dummy asset tracing: as soon as the money had been conceptualised as property,158 the 
case became a conflict between claimant and defendant as to the relative status of their respective titles. 
The question was then whether the defendant could raise the defence of bona fide purchase, which 
was resolved by her acquisition of knowledge. If we do not admit the first (fictional) step, knowledge 
may still be relevant, but it goes instead to the question of whether the third party is able to set up her 
rights as a defence to the claim to rescind a transaction effected in breach of trust.159 
 
 
(iii) Fiduciary liability  
 
A by-product of the analysis in this article is a new reason for doubting the continued utility of so-
called  “common law tracing”, either within and outside of the context of bank transfers. I have argued 
that in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale, the firm’s claim to the cash in Cass’ hands, which claim persisted and 
grounded a claim against the casino, ought to have been in the nature of a trust.160 And I have defended 
 
157 [2015] UKPC 35; [2016] A.C. 297 at [38]; [41] (Lord Toulson). 
158 See [2010] EWHC 3275; [2011] Fam. Law 803. 
159 See R. Nolan, “Fiduciaries and their flawed decisions” 129 L.Q.R. 469 at 471; R. Nolan, “Controlling fiduciary 
power” (2009) 68 C.L.J. 293 at 322; C. Mitchell, “Reining in the rule in Re Hastings-Bass” (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 35 at 42; 
C. Mitchell, P. Mitchell and S. Watterson (eds), Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (2017), at paras. [29-18]–[29-
27]. 
160 See above, the text accompanying fn. 100-103. 
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the move away from the kind of strict liability claim for the passive receipt of a putative asset for which 
Hambrouck and FC Jones stand as precarious authority.161   
However, we must be careful not to make too much of this conclusion. There have been many 
arguments to the effect that a corollary of the loss of a distinct law of tracing at common law is the 
loss of any distinct role for fiduciary duties in establishing a connection between old and new assets.162 
Yet, quite apart from reducing the importance of fiduciary duties, replacing dummy asset tracing may 
place a renewed emphasis on the status of the party responsible for the loss. For instance, there may 
well be an argument from fiduciary responsibility for allowing a beneficiary to “cherry-pick” the 
product of an unauthorised investment made by the trustee, which does not also require us to treat the 
account as a corporeal confusion of funds; such an argument would necessitate careful consideration 
of the scope and form of the core custodial duty.163  
This is what we gain by replacing dummy asset tracing, and it warrants emphasis: arguments 
that concern the existence and extent of liability cannot be made by simple analogy with cash transfers; 
they must be made with clear reference to the contours and content of the relationship between 




I have argued that the process of tracing money through bank transfers is distinct from the process of 
demonstrating that two rights are connected by an exchange, which has been called “exchange product 
tracing”. A claimant who traces through bank payments and claims in equity does so on the basis of a 
notional rights-transfer; a claimant who traces through bank payments and claims at law does so on 
the basis of a notional transfer of some physical thing. I have called these processes “dummy asset 
tracing”.  
I have demonstrated that allowing principles of property to inform the template for liability in 
bank payments cases has had important remedial consequences: an innocent payee may now be held 
liable to a claimant with whom she did not transact, on the basis of an earlier debit to the claimant’s 
account in which she played no part. I have argued that there is no robust justification for holding a 
payee liable in circumstances that gave her no reason to suspect that her activities would conflict with 
the claimant’s prior entitlement 
Finally, I have suggested that recent authorities indicate a move towards placing the legal 
relationship between claimant and defendant at the heart of the justification for holding the latter liable 
for money wrongfully diverted from the former. And insofar as this move is incompatible with those 
 
161 Cf Heperu v Belle [2009] NSWCA 252. 
162 See e.g. P. Birks, “The Necessity of a Unitary Law of Tracing” in R. Cranston (ed.), Making Commercial Law: Essays 
in Honour of Roy Goode (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997); P. Birks, “Taking Seriously the Differences Between 
Tracing and Claiming” (1997) 11 T.L.I. 2. 
163 See further J. Campbell (2016) 42 Aust. Bar Rev. 32.  
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authorities in which the justification for strict liability depends upon the defendant’s passive receipt of 
a notional money asset, I have argued that we should promote normative rigour over narrative 
cohesion.  
 
